

This document is classified as **Clear** in accordance with the Panel Information Policy. Recipients can distribute this information to the world, there is no limit on disclosure. Information may be shared without restriction subject to copyright.

DP282 ‘Removal of Registration Check for Suppliers using SR8.9 targeting SMETS2+ CHF’

Annex A

Legal text – version 0.1

About this document

This document contains the redlined changes to the SEC that would be required to deliver this Modification Proposal.

Appendix AB 'Service Request Processing Document'

These changes have been redlined against Appendix AB version 11.0.

Amend Section 6.2 as follows:

6 Obligations of the DCC: Processing Service Requests

- 6.1 Subject to Clause 18 (Obligations of the DCC: Non-Device Service Requests), where the DCC receives a Service Request from a User, the DCC shall send an Acknowledgement to the User, and (whether before or after such Acknowledgement is sent) apply the following checks:
- (a) Verify the Service Request;
 - (b) confirm that the Service Request has been sent by a User whose right to send that Service Request has not been suspended in accordance with Section M8.5 (Suspension of Rights), and that such User is acting in a User Role which is an Eligible User Role for that Service Request;
 - (c) in the case of Non-Critical Service Requests (other than an 'Update Firmware' Service Request, an 'Update PPMID Firmware' Service Request, a 'CoS Update Security Credentials' Service Request or a 'Top Up Device' SMETS1 Service Request with a Command Variant value of 2) and SMETS1 Critical Service Requests, confirm that the SMI Status of the Device identified in the Service Request is: (i) 'commissioned'; (ii) 'installed not commissioned'; (iii) 'whitelisted'; or (iv) 'pending';
 - (d) Check Cryptographic Protection for the Service Request;
 - (e) Confirm Validity of the Certificate used to Check Cryptographic Protection for the Service Request, and confirm that the Certificate used to Check Cryptographic Protection for the Service Request has a Remote Party Role of "xmlSign";
 - (f) subject to Clause 6.2, in the case of Non-Critical Service Requests and SMETS1 Critical Service Requests, confirm (using the Registration Data, the Device ID within the Service Request, and the relationship between the Device IDs and the MPRNs or MPANs in the Smart Metering Inventory) that the User sending the Service Request is a User that is or will be an Eligible User for that Service Request:
 - (i) for all times within any date range requested;
 - (ii) where there is no such date range, at the specified time for execution; or
 - (iii) where there is no date range and no date for execution is specified, at the time at which the check is being carried out;
 - (g) in the case of a 'CoS Update Security Credentials' Service Request:
 - (i) confirm that the User ID in the Certificate used to Check Cryptographic Protection of the Service Request is the same as the User ID in the Service Request;
 - (ii) confirm that the MPID that is used in the carrying out of the check referred to in Clause 6.1(f) above is the same as an MPID that is contained within the Subject X520 Organizational Unit Name field (as described in the Organisation Certificate Policy) of the Certificate used to Check Cryptographic Protection for the Service Request; and
 - (iii) confirm that the MPAN or MPRN (as relevant) associated with the target Device in the Smart Metering Inventory is the same as the MPAN or MPRN included within the 'CoS Update Security Credentials' Service Request;
 - (iv) confirm that the number of Organisation Certificates contained within the Service Request is necessary and sufficient for the target Device;
 - (v) confirm that all of the replacement Organisation Certificates have a Remote Party Role of "supplier";

- (vi) confirm that the Key Usage of each such Organisation Certificate is compatible with the Trust Anchor Cell in relation to which the relevant Device Security Credentials are to be replaced;
 - (vii) where relevant, confirm that the SupplierPrepaymentTopUpFloorSeqNumber data item has been included within the Service Request;
 - (viii) confirm that the User ID contained within each of the Organisation Certificates included within the Service Request is associated with the User submitting the Service Request; and
 - (ix) confirm that the MPRN or MPAN included within the Service Request is Associated with the Device identified within the Service Request;
 - (h) in the case of a 'Restore HAN Device Log' or a 'Restore Gas Proxy Function Device Log' Service Request, confirm that the Device Log Data to be restored originates from a Communications Hub Function or Gas Proxy Function that forms (or formed immediately prior to its replacement) part of a Smart Metering System for which the User making such Service Request is (or, immediately prior to its replacement, was) the Responsible Supplier;
 - (i) in the case of an 'Update Firmware' Service Request or an 'Update PPMID Firmware' Service Request, confirm that the Hash calculated across the Manufacturer Image contained within the Service Request is the same as the entry within the Central Products List (as identified by the Device ID, information in the Smart Metering Inventory and the firmware version specified in the Service Request);
 - (j) in the case of any Service Request that contains any Certificates, Confirm Validity of those Certificates;
 - (k) in the case of any Service Request that is seeking to replace any part of the Device Security Credentials held on or in relation to a Device with information from an Organisation Certificate contained within that Service Request, confirm that:
 - (i) the Issuing OCA Certificate for each such Organisation Certificate is also contained within that Service Request; and
 - (ii) each Issuing OCA Certificate contained within that Service Request has been used to Issue at least one of the Organisation Certificates contained within that Service Request;
 - (l) in the case of an 'Update HAN Device Log' Service Request requesting the addition of a Smart Meter or a Standalone Auxiliary Proportional Controller to the Device Log of a Communications Hub Function confirm (using the Registration Data and the MPRN or MPAN in the Service Request) that the User sending the Service Request is a Responsible Supplier in respect of that MPRN or MPAN;
 - (m) in the case of a 'Set CHF Sub GHz Configuration' Service Request, that the settings requested would only allow a CHF to use Sub GHz Available Channels (as defined in the GBCS);
 - (n) in respect of a SMETS1 Critical Service Request, a 'Request Handover of DCC Controlled Device' SMETS1 Service Request, a 'Top Up Device' SMETS1 Service Request, or a 'CoS Update Security Credentials' Service Request relating to either a SMETS1 or SMETS2+ Device, confirm that the Service Request is not a Replay; and
 - (o) in the case of SMETS1 'Activate Firmware' Service Requests, where the target Device is a SMETS1 CHF or a SMETS1 PPMID, confirm (using the Registration Data, the Device ID within the Service Request, and the relationship between the Device IDs and the MPANs in the Smart Metering Inventory) that the User sending the Service Request is the Import Supplier for the ESME on the same home area network.
- 6.2 The step set out at Clause 6.1(f) shall not apply in the following circumstances (and, where it is necessary to identify a Responsible Supplier, the DCC shall do so using the Registration Data, the Device ID within the Service Request, and the relationship between the Device IDs and the MPRNs or MPANs in the Smart Metering Inventory):
- (a) an Import Supplier that is the Responsible Supplier for a Smart Metering System that shares a Communications Hub Function with a Smart Metering System that includes a Gas Smart Meter sends a 'Join Service' Service Request to join that Gas Smart Meter to a Gas Proxy Function;

- (b) an Import Supplier that is the Responsible Supplier for a Smart Metering System that shares a Communications Hub Function with a Smart Metering System that includes a Gas Proxy Function sends a 'Restore GPF Device Log' Service Request to restore the Device Log of that Gas Proxy Function; ~~or~~
- (c) the Service Request has been sent by a User acting in the User Role of 'Other User'; or
- ~~(e)~~ (d) a 'Read Device Log' Service Request has been sent targeting a Communications Hub Function that forms part of a SMETS2+ Communications Hub by a User acting in the User Role of 'Import Supplier' or 'Gas Supplier'.

6.3 Where any of the checks in Clause 6.1 are not satisfied in respect of a Service Request, the DCC shall not be obliged to undertake any of the other checks that remain to be undertaken, and the DCC shall reject the Service Request (and, save where Clause 6.1(d) is not satisfied, notify the User of such rejection and of the reasons for such rejection via the DCC User Interface).

Appendix AD ‘DCC User Interface Specification’

These changes have been redlined against Appendix AD version 5.3.

Amend Section 3.8.113.3 as follows:

3.8.113.3 Specific Validation for this Request

See clause 3.2.5 for general validation applied to all Requests.

For this Request, the general Authorisation Checks as defined below shall not be carried out.

- a Response Code of E5 as defined in clause 3.2.4 “Verify that the Service Request or Signed Pre-Command is applicable to the Device status”
- a Response Code of E4 as defined in clause 3.2.4 “Verify that the User, in the User Role defined in the Service Request is an Eligible User for the Device”